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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
AVOIDABLE LIENS . The debtor owned a mobile home
which was subject to a non-possessory, non-purchase money
security interest. The debtor claimed the home as exempt and
sought to avoid the lien as impairing the exemption, under
Section 522(f), of a household good. The court held that a
mobile home was not a household good; therefore, the lien
avoidance provision did not apply. In re Hoss, 233 B.R. 684
(W.D. Va. 1999).
EXEMPTIONS .
RURAL HOMESTEAD. The debtor owned a one-half
interest in 200 acres of ranch land, a 34 acre tract of
contiguous, unfenced ranch land and three acres of fenced
land leased to an oil company. The debtor lived with the
debtor’s parent, who owned the other half interest in the
ranch land, on a parcel owned by the parent. The debtor
presented no evidence of plans to reside on any one of the
three parcels. The debtor claimed the 136 acres as rural
homestead property exempt under Tex. Prop. Code §
41.002(b)(1), arguing that the exemption did not require that
the debtor live on the property, since the property was used to
support the debtor and the debtor’s family. The court held
that the exemption required the debtor to live on the property
or to at least demonstrate a present intent to reside on the
property and denied the entire exemption. In re Brooks, 233
B.R. 696 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1999).
The debtor had owned a 89 acre farm for several years
before granting a life estate in the property to the debtor’s
parents. The debtor then leased the property from the parents
who lived on other property. The debtor initially paid rent to
the parents but had not paid rent in recent years. The debtor
claimed the property as an exempt rural homestead. The
creditors argued that the debtor did not have a sufficient
interest in the property to claim an exemption. The court held
that the reversionary interest plus the possessory interest as a
tenant were sufficient interest in the property to claim the
exemption. In re Eskew, 233 B.R. 708 (Bankr. W.D. Tex.
1998).
CHAPTER 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
DISMISSAL . The debtors had been under bankruptcy
protection over several cases spanning 13 years. The basic
difficulty arose from the debtors’ sale of a crop which was
security for a loan from a supplier. The debtors admitted to
the sale and the validity of the security interest; however, the
debtors’ plans first treated the creditor as unsecured, arguing
that the loss of the collateral destroyed the security interest.
The debtors’ final plan did not provide for any plan payments
to the supplier but placed the supplier’s claim outside of the
bankruptcy plan as not discharged. The debtors had contested
the claim because they claimed that seed and other supplies
provided by the supplier were defective. The Bankruptcy
Court refused to confirm the final plan and dismissed the case
for failure to file a confirmable plan. The Bankruptcy Court
had repeatedly warned the debtors to propose a plan which
provided for the supplier’s claim. The District Court
affirmed, holding that the debtors’ excessive delays in the
face of repeated warnings from the Bankruptcy Court
demonstrated a lack of good faith and abuse of the
bankruptcy process. In re Barger, 233 B.R. 80 (Bankr. 8th
Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL TAXATION     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
AUTOMATIC STAY. The debtors filed their 1978 and
1979 tax returns but failed to pay the taxes. The debtors filed
for Chapter 7 in July 1982 and the IRS obtained the debtors’
consent to extend the times for assessment for 1978 and
1979. In April 1988, the Chapter 7 case was dismissed but the
IRS was not notified about the dismissal until October 1989,
although the IRS asked the Clerk of Court 13 times about the
status of the case. The debtors filed a second case in July
1990 and received a general discharge in November 1990.
The IRS then proceeded to levy against the debtors’ assets for
payment of the 1978 and 1979 deficiencies. The debtors
argued that the assessment period had expired and that the
general discharge in the second case had discharged the
taxes. The court held that the filing of the first case
suspended the assessment period until the IRS was notified
about the dismissal of the case. The court held that the IRS
had reasonably relied on the Clerk of Court to provide correct
information about the case. The court also held that the taxes
were not discharged in the second case because the tax claim
was a priority claim not subject to discharge. Richmond v.
United States, 172 F.3d 1099 (9th Cir. 1999).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
CROP INSURANCE. The plaintiff leased land from the
Fish and Wildlife Service and other parties. The leases
provided that the plaintiff’s share of the crop would be
determined from the number of acres planted or prevented
from planting, except that acres prevented from planting
because of backwater flooding were not included. The
plaintiff filed a crop insurance claim for crops which could
not be planted due to backwater flooding but the claim was
d nied because the plaintiff had no interest in any crop in the
backwater-flooded acres. The court held that, under lease the
plaintiff had no share in a crop not planted because of
backwater flooding; therefore, the plaintiff had no insurable
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interest in any of those acres to support a crop insurance
claim. Davidson v. Glickman, 169 F.3d 996 (5th Cir.
1999).
DAIRY RECOURSE LOAN PROGRAM . Beginning on
January 1, 2000, the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC)
will make recourse loans to commercial processors of dairy
products. The CCC has issued proposed regulations which
would make recourse loans available to dairy processors
through a central location, as opposed to in-person
applications taken at Farm Service Agency (FSA) state or
county offices, allow the loan collateral to be based on a
rolling, commingled inventory, versus an identity preserved
inventory, and miscellaneous other changes which would
provide for a more customer-friendly program. 64 Fed. Reg.
39442 (July 22, 1999).
FARM PROGRAM HANDBOOKS . The plaintiff had
originally filed a Report of Acreage, ASCS Form 578,
showing the number of acres planned to be planted and the
number of acres for conserving use. Because of backwater
flooding, much of the conserving use acres were flooded. The
plaintiff sought to change the acreage report to include the
conserving acres in the prevented planting acres. The county
FSA disapproved the revision, pointing to a handbook
provision, ASCS Handbook 2-CP § 83, prohibiting revision
of acreage reports where the revision would benefit the
producer. The plaintiff argued that the handbook provision
was a legislative rule which was void because the handbook
provision had been promulgated under the procedures
required by the Administrative Procedures Act. Instead, 7
C.F.R. § 718.24 controlled and allowed revisions of acreage
reports without limitation. The court agreed, holding that the
handbook provision went beyond the rules in the regulations
and required notice and comment procedures before being
effective. Davidson v. Glickman, 169 F.3d 996 (5th Cir.
1999).
JURISDICTION . The plaintiff was a dairy which filed a
petition with the USDA challenging the validity of the
assessment under the Dairy Promotion Program. The plaintiff
sought interim relief allowing it to deposit the assessment in
an escrow account pending resolution of the matter. The
Administrative Law Judge denied the request and the plaintiff
sought review in the District Court. The District Court held
that it did not have jurisdiction because the ALJ ruling was
not a final ruling of the administrative process on the main
issue of the case, the assessment under the DPP. The
appellate court affirmed, holding that the plaintiff had to
complete the administrative review process before seeking
review by the courts. Gallo Cattle Co. v. U.S.D.A., 159 F.3d
1194 (9th Cir. 1998).
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT . The plaintiff was a produce distributor which sold 16
shipments of potatoes to a company which was connected to
the defendant. The plaintiff brought a reparations action to
collect for the potatoes but the defendant did not participate
in the administrative procedures. A reparations award was
granted to the plaintiff and the plaintiff sought to enforce the
order in the District Court. The defendant raised new
defenses in the District Court case and the plaintiff argued
that no new issues could be litigated in an enforcement
action. The court held that a judicial review of a reparation
order was a trial de novo and the defendant could raise issues
as if the case was an original trial. The first defense raised
was that the defendant was not subject to PACA because the
defendant was not licensed at the time of the transactions.
The court found that the only change in the defendant was
that the defendant had been licensed but the license had
expired less than four weeks before the transactions;
therefore, the defendant failed to show that it was not subject
to PACA. The second defense was that the contracts involved
were void for violating the Illinois Statute of Frauds. The
court held that failure to satisfy the Illinois Statute of Frauds
did not make a contract void, only unenforceable in state
courts; therefore, the Statute of Frauds did not affect liability
under PACA. United Potato Co., Inc. v. Burghard & Sons,
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 2d 894 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
PSEUDORABIES. The APHIS has issued interim animal
health regulations to provide for the payment of indemnity by
the USDA for the voluntary depopulation of herds of swine
known to be infected with pseudorabies. The payment of
indemnity will encourage depopulation of infected herds and,
therefore, will reduce the risk of other swine becoming
infected with the disease. The program was to expire on July
15, 1999 but has been continued indefinitely. 64 Fed. Reg.
37395 (July 12, 1999).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
1999 TAX BILL. The U.S. House of Representatives has
passed tax legislation which includes the following provision:
The estate and gift tax would be eliminated over a 10-year
period. The step-up of tax basis would also be eliminated
except for property passing to a surviving spouse and
property with a fair market value of $2 million or less. Any
indebtedness against property would reduce its fair market
value. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
GIFT . The decedent had owned stock with a predeceased
sister. Title to the stock was held in the sister’s name alone;
however, the sisters declared the income from the stock as
co-owners. After the death of the sister, the decedent
transferred the decedent’s share of stock by sales agreement
and deed of gift to the decedent’s niece and nephews. The
stock certificates were not transferred, however, until the next
tax year. The court held that the decedent had sufficient
ownership in the stock to transfer them, the sales agreement
and deed of gift were sufficient to complete the gifts when
executed and the delivery of the certificates was not required
because the decedent had demonstrated sufficient intent to
make the gift from the documents. Esta e of Davenport v.
Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,348 (10th Cir.
1999), aff’g, T.C. Memo. 1997-390.
TRANSFERS WITH RETAINED INTERESTS- ALM  §
5.02[3].* In 1951, the decedent and parent owned most of the
stock of a family corporation. In order to meet the inheritance
and control desires of the shareholders, the decedent and
parent entered into an agreement for the transfer of the
parent's stock at death to the decedent in trust for life with
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remainders to the parent's grandchildren. The decedent
agreed to transfer the decedent's stock by will to the same
trusts. The IRS argued that, although the agreement was
reached in bona fide bargaining and the decedent did provide
some consideration for the agreement, the consideration was
not full and adequate; therefore, the stock in the trusts was
included in the decedent's gross estate. The IRS argued that
the consideration had to equal the value of the entire property
transferred; whereas, the estate argued that the consideration
only had to equal the value of the remainder interest
transferred. The Tax Court held that the value of the
decedent's future contribution of stock was not sufficient
consideration for the parent's agreement to transfer stock to
the trusts; therefore, the decedent's interest in the trust was
not received for adequate consideration. The Tax Court
included the value of the stock in the trusts in the decedent's
gross estate, decreased by the value of the decedent's stock
contributed to the trusts. The appellate court reversed,
holding that the property would not be included in the
decedent’s estate if the decedent’s consideration equaled the
value of the remainder interest transferred by the parent. The
case was remanded for a determination of values. The
appellate court also held that the valuation date was the date
of the original agreement. Estate of Magnin v. Comm'r, 99-
2 U.C. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,347 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’g,
T.C. Memo. 1996-25.
VALUATION OF STOCK . The decedent was a
shareholder in a law firm corporation. The corporation had
purchased life insurance on the life of the decedent which
would fund the purchase of the decedent’s stock and any
cases or work in progress. The firm paid the $5 million
insurance proceeds to the decedent’s estate and characterized
$4 million of it as non-employee compensation. The estate
claimed that the proceeds were paid entirely for the
decedent’s stock. The Tax Court held that, under the life
insurance stock purchase agreement, the insurance proceeds
were not intended only for payment for the stock. The Tax
Court valued the stock without considering the insurance
policy or advanced client costs. The appellate court agreed
that the insurance proceeds were, in part, compensation for
the decedent’s cases and work in progress and were income
in respect of decedent. The appellate court also affirmed as to
exclusion of the insurance policy from the value of the stock,
holding that the value of the insurance policy was offset by
the stock purchase obligation. The appellate court remanded
the case for inclusion of the advanced client costs in
determining the value of the stock, because the advances
were treated as loans on the corporation’s books. E tate of
Cartwright v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶
50,666 (9th Cir. 1999).
The decedent owned 12,000 shares of stock in a bank
corporation which had issued 100,000 total shares. The stock
was not sold publicly but 1,100 shares were sold one month
before the decedent’s death. The court used that sale as
evidence of the fair market value of the stock because the sale
was arm’s length and had no special circumstances. The court
discounted the decedent’s stock by 10 percent for the large
block of shares, acknowledging that the shares could be sold
in smaller blocks over time. Estate of Branson v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1999-231.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
1999 TAX BILL. The U.S. House of Representatives has
passed tax legislation which includes the following
provisions:
(1) The individual capital gains tax rates would be reduced
fr m 20 percent to 15 percent and from 10 percent to 7.5
percent (for taxpayers in the 15 percent individual income tax
bracket). The corporate capital gains tax rate would be
red ced from 35 percent to 30 percent in 2004
(2) A 100 percent deduction would be provided for health
insurance premiums and long-term care insurance premiums.
(3) An additional exemption (currently $2,750) would be
provid  for individuals who care for elderly family members
at hom .
(4) The availability of medical savings accounts (MSAs)
would be expanded and the MSA program would be made
perman nt.
(5) Employers would be allowed to offer long-term care
insurance in cafeteria plans.
(6) The Housing and Urban Development Secretary would
be authorized to designate 20 renewal communities in both
urban and rural areas.
(7) The alternative minimum tax for both individuals and
corporations would be phased out.
(8) A number of expiring tax credits, including the research,
work opportunity, and welfare-to-work tax credits would be
extended.
(9) Medicare beneficiaries would be allowed to take an
above-the-line deduction, meaning individuals may take the
deduction whether or not they itemize, to cover the cost of
prescription drug insurance coverage, contingent upon certain
Medicare changes. H.R. 2488, 106th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1999).
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION . The taxpayers were trusts
which owned rural land on which a man-made lake was
located. A school district had purchased property neighboring
the lake and was required by the local water management
plan to provide 15 percent of its land for water retention for
prevention and control of floods. The taxpayers conveyed a
perpetual easement over a portion of the lake to the school
district, essentially allocating the water retention ability of
that portion of the lake to the school district for purposes of
meeting the school district’s 15 percent water retention
requirements for the neighboring property. The IRS ruled that
the easement qualified for a charitable deduction as a
qualified conservation easement. Ltr. Rul. 9927014, April 7,
1999.
CORPORATIONS
DEFINITION. The taxpayer was employed full time as an
engin er. The taxpayer formed a corporation for the purpose
of designing and marketing a suspended light rail system to
state and local governments. The corporation had no income
and did not acquire any contracts, but the taxpayer incurred
exp nses associated with attempting to convince
governments to build the system. The taxpayer claimed the
expenses as personal business deductions, arguing that the
corporation should be ignored as merely a method of
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presenting a business appearance to prospective customers.
The court held that the corporation was validly formed and
served a business purpose; therefore, the expenses were
deductible only by the corporation. The court also noted that
the expenses would also have to be amortized over 60 months
as start-up expenses. Willits v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-
230.
The taxpayer had formed a corporation but the corporation
had no office outside of the taxpayer’s home, no phone
number and conducted no business other than alleged
services provided by the taxpayer to the taxpayer’s wife in
her employment as a loan officer. The wife paid the
corporation $100,000 for alleged services performed solely
by the taxpayer. The court held that the taxpayer failed to
provide any substantiating evidence that the services were
performed or were worth what was paid for them. Therefore,
the court held that the $100,000 was not deductible as a
business expense and was taxable income to the taxpayer.
Boehm v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-227.
DEPRECIATION . The taxpayers owned a tobacco farm
and claimed depreciation for a barn used for storing, curing
and preparing tobacco produced on their farm. The court held
that the barn was not eligible for expense method
depreciation because it did not qualify as a “structure other
than a building” under I.R.C. § 1245(a)(3)(B). The court also
held that the barn did not qualify as a single purpose
horticultural structure under I.R.C. §§ 1245(a)(3)(D),
168(I)(13)(B)(ii), because the barn was not used exclusively
for the production of a horticultural product. The barn was
classified as 20-year property and as a farm building under
Rev. Proc. 87-56. Hart v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1999-236.
IRA . The taxpayer’s spouse died owning an interest in two
IRAs. The taxpayer was the designated surviving beneficiary
of the IRAs and created four additional IRAs, each with a
different child as the remainder beneficiary. The IRS ruled
that the amount rolled over from the decedent’s IRAs into the
new IRAs was not included in the taxpayer’s income. Ltr.
Rul. 9928040, April 20, 1999.
INSTALLMENT SALES . For expense method
depreciation on assets disposed of by installment sale, all
payments received under the contract are deemed to have
been received in the year of sale to the extent of expense
method depreciation claimed on the property.  I.R.C. §
453(i)(1). Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House
of Representatives which would exclude from this rule
property used in a farming business (as defined in I.R.C. §
263A(e)(4)). H.R. 2537, 106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
INTEREST . The taxpayers owned a horse which was an
asset of a horse farm business. The horse died and the
taxpayers received the proceeds of an insurance claim. The
taxpayers elected to defer the gain, intending to repurchase
another horse. However, no horse was purchased and the
taxpayers filed an amended return to include the gain
recognized plus interest. The taxpayers sought to deduct the
interest paid on the taxes as a business expense. The court
followed the precedent of the Fourth, Eighth and Ninth
Circuit Courts of Appeals in holding that interest on federal
taxes was nondeductible personal interest. Kirk v. United
States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,687 (E.D. Ky.
1999).
MEAL AND ENTERTAINMENT EXPENSES .
Legislation has been introduced in the U.S. House of
Repres ntatives which would increase over eight years the
deductible portion of meal and entertainment expenses from
th  current 50 percent to 80 percent (in 2008). H.R. 2554,
106th Cong., 1st Sess. (1999).
The IRS has announced three actions as a result of the
Ninth Circuit's opinion in Boyd Gaming Corporation v.
Comm'r,--F.3d --(9th Cir. 1999), rev'g T.C. Memo 1997-445.
The IRS (1) acquiesced in the opinion, (2) withdrew
proposed training materials relating primarily to the
application of I.R.C. § 119 to employer-provided meals in the
hospitality industry, Ann. 98-77, I.R.B. 1998-34, 30 and (3)
terminated the settlement initiative related to this issue, Ann.
98-78, I.R.B. 1998-34, 30. Ann. 99-77, I.R.B. 1999-32.
OFFERS IN COMPROMISE . The IRS has issued
temporary regulations governing offers in compromise of
income tax owed. The temporary regulations continue the
traditional grounds for compromise based on doubt as to
liability or doubt as to collectibility. In addition, to reflect the
changes made in RRA 1998, the temporary regulations allow
a compromise where there is no doubt as to liability or as to
collectibility, but where either (1) collection of the liability
would create economic hardship, or (2) exceptional
circumstances exist such that collection of the liability would
be detrimental to voluntary compliance. Compromise based
on these hardship and equity bases may not, however, be
authorized if it would undermine compliance. Although the
temporary regulations set forth the conditions that must be
satisfied to accept an offer to compromise liabilities arising
under the internal revenue laws, they do not prescribe the
terms or conditions that should be contained in such offers.
Thus, the amount to be paid and future compliance or other
conditions precedent to satisfaction of a liability for less than
the full amount due are matters left to the discretion of the
Secretary.
The temporary regulations also add provisions relating to
the promulgation of requirements for providing for basic
living expenses, evaluating offers from low income
taxpayers, and reviewing rejected offers, as required by RRA
1998. The temporary regulations provide for the development
and publication of national and local living allowances that
permit taxpayers entering into offers in compromise to have
an adequate means to provide for their basic living expenses.
In accordance with I.R.C. § 7122(c)(3)(A), the temporary
regulations also require the development of supplemental
guidelines for the evaluation of offers from “low income”
taxpayers. 64 Fed. Reg. 39020 (July 21, 1999).
RENTAL PROPERTY . The taxpayers, husband and wife,
purchased the house owned by the wife’s parents and rented
the house back to them at $100 less than the fair rental value
of the house. The taxpayers claimed expenses and
depreciation associated with the house as held for production
of income. The court held that, because the house was not
rented for fair rental value, the house was considered as used
by the taxpayers as a personal residence. Therefore, the court
held that the taxpayers were not entitled to any deductions as
to expenses associated with the property as income property.
The taxpayer were eligible only for Schedule A deductions,
including taxes and interest. Jackson v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 1999-226.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced the publication of
revised Form 706-GS(D) (Revised June 1999), Generation-
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Skipping Transfer Tax Return For Distributions and Form
706-GS(D-1) (Revised June 1999), Notification of
Distribution From a Generation-Skipping Trust. These
documents are available at no charge and can be obtained
either: (1) by calling the IRS's toll-free telephone number, 1-
800-TAX-FORM (1-800-829-3676); (2) via the World Wide
Web at http://www.irs.ustreas.gov/prod/; (3) through
FedWorld on the Internet; or (4) by directly accessing the
Internal Revenue Information Services bulletin board at (703)
321-8020.
For 1996 and 1997, the taxpayer claimed an exemption for
a minor son but failed to provide a social security or taxpayer
identification number for the son as required by I.R.C. § 151.
Instead, the taxpayer filed an affidavit pursuant to Treas. Reg.
§ 301.6109-1(c) and claimed that the regulation provided an
exception to the statute. The court held that the statute took
precedence over the regulation and created an absolute
requirement that no exemption was allowed if the return did
not report a SSN or TIN for the dependent claimed as an
exemption. Furlow v. United States, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,684 (D. Md. 1999).,
REVENUE BULLETINS . The IRS has announced a
change in the format of the Internal Revenue Bulletin.
Beginning with I.R.B. 1999-28, the page numbers will run
consecutively from one I.R.B. to the next instead of starting
each I.R.B. with page one. Reprints of the weekly I.R.B.s will
be bound together to form the Cumulative Bulletin. Ann. 99-
69, I.R.B. 1999-28, 33.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
August 1999
AnnualSemi-annualQuarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 5.43 5.36 5.32 5.30
110 percent AFR5.99 5.90 5.86 5.83
120 percent AFR6.53 6.43 6.38 6.35
Mid-term
AFR 5.96 5.87 5.83 5.80
110 percent AFR 6.56 6.46 6.416.37
120 percent AFR 7.16 7.04 6.986.94
Long-term
AFR 6.23 6.14 6.09 6.06
110 percent AFR 6.86 6.75 6.696.66
120 percent AFR 7.51 7.37 7.307.26
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
ELECTION. Four shareholders elected to have their
corporation taxed as an S corporation. However, a
misunderstanding between the shareholders and the
professional preparing the election for the corporation caused
the Form 2553, Election by a Small Business Corporation, to
not be filed. The shareholders, however, filed their personal
income tax returns as if the election had been properly filed.
The IRS granted the corporation an extension to file the Form
2553 within 60 days after receiving the letter ruling. Ltr.
Rul. 9928026, April 19, 1999.
INADVERTENT TERMINATION. The taxpayers had
formed two S corporations. One shareholder transferred
shares in one corporation to the other corporation. The
transfer caused the first corporation to lose S corporation
status, an effect not understood by the shareholder. All parties
had filed returns as if the S corporation elections were
effective. The shareholders planned to rectify the situation by
transferring all of the first corporation’s stock to the second
and filing a qualified subchapter S subsidiary election for the
first corporation. The IRS ruled that the termination would be
waived as inadvertent. Ltr. Rul. 9928024, April 16, 1999.
TARGETED JOBS TAX CREDIT . The taxpayer had
employed persons during the effective years of the targeted
jobs tax credit. The court found that the taxpayer and
employees had satisfied all of the statutory requirements for
the credit except receiving certification from a local agency.
The only reason the local agency did not certify the
employees was because of lack of resources and because the
federal government shut down the program before all of the
certifications were processed. The taxpayer claimed the credit
anyway, arguing that it had made a good faith effort to obtain
c rtification. The IRS argued that the regulations, Treas. Reg.
§ 1.51-1(d)(1), required the certification in order to take the
credit. The court held that the taxpayer was entitled to the
credit because the certification process was required only as a
mea s to reduce uncertainty as to whether employees met the
requirements for the credit; therefore, once it was determined
by the IRS that the employees met the requirements, the
taxpayer was eligible for the credit, even without
certification. Perdue Farms, Inc. v. United States, 99-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,659 (D. Md. 1999).
TRADE OR BUSINESS. The taxpayers purchased rural
land on which they built a log cabin for a personal residence.
The taxpayer formed a corporation to own the land; however,
the taxpayers presented no evidence of a business operated by
the corporation and presented no evidence of corporate bank
accounts or business expenses. The court held that the
taxpayers could not claim any business deductions associated
with the property. Streck v. Comm’r, 99-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) ¶ 50,650 (6th Cir. 1999).
STATE REGULATIONS OF
AGRICULTURE
WETLANDS . The plaintiff had purchased land which was
regulated wetlands and was restricted to use as a peat farm.
The plaintiff wanted to convert the land with some trenching
and filling to make it suitable for cranberry farming but the
state denied a permit under the Michigan Wetlands Protection
Act (WPA), Mich. Cod. Laws §§ 324.30301 et seq. The
plaintiff argued that because the plaintiff was going to farm
the land, the plaintiff was exempted from the WPA
provisions. The court looked to the federal Clean Water Act
(CWA) which required a state to enact laws at least as
restrictive as the federal act in order for the state to
administer the CWA in the state. Because the CWA
prohibited activities on wetlands that made farming possible
or expanded farming operations, the state law had to be
interpreted to require the same restrictions. Therefore, the
court held that activities on wetlands which made a new type
of farming possible were prohibited by the WPA and the state
was correct to deny the plaintiff’s permit. Hugge t v. DNR,
590 N.W.2d 747 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998).
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4th Annual
SEMINAR IN PARADISE
FARM ESTATE AND BUSINESS PLANNING
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 24-28, 2000
Royal Lahaina Resort, Kaanapali Beach, Island of Maui, Hawai’i
Celebrate the Millenium by leaving winter behind and spending a week in Hawai'i in January 2000! Balmy
trade winds, 70-80 degrees, palm trees, white sand Kaanapali beach and the rest of paradise can be yours;
plus a world-class seminar on Farm Estate and Business Planning by Dr. Neil E. Harl and Prof. Roger A.
McEowen.  The seminar is scheduled for January 24-28, 2000 at the spectacular ocean-front Royal Lahaina
Resort on the island of Maui, Hawai'i.
Seminar sessions run from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. each day, Monday through Friday, with plenty of time to
golf, play tennis or just lay in the warm Hawaian sun. A continental breakfast and break refreshments for
each day are included in the registration fee,  Each participant will receive a copy of Dr. Harl's 500 page
seminar manual, Farm Estate and Business Planning: Annotated Materials which will be updated just prior
to the seminar. A CD-ROM version will also be available for a small additional charge.
     Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
   • Introduction to estate and business planning.
   • Liquidity planning with emphasis on 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax.
   • Co-ownership of property, including discounts, taxation and special problems.
   • Federal estate tax, including alternate valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business
deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize
tax over deaths of both spouses, and generation skipping transfer tax.
   • Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden”
gifts.
   • Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales,
private annuities, self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
   • Using trusts, including funding of revocable living trusts and medicaid trusts
.  • Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and
limited liability companies.
Early registration is important to obtain the lowest airfares and insure availability of convenient flights at
a busy travel time of the year. Attendees are eligible for substantial discounts on hotel rooms at the Royal
Lahaina Resort, the site of the seminar.
The seminar registration fee is $645 for current subscribers to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural
Law Manual, or Principles of Agricultural Law. The registration fee for nonsubscribers is $695.
Call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958 or e-mail: aglaw@aol.com, if you need a brochure for either seminar.
Also, see our web site for details and registration forms:  http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
